State v. Hunter Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40950 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-13-2013
State v. Hunter Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40950
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hunter Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40950" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4323.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4323
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA Opy 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) No. 40950 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Ada Co.lBoise City Case No. 
vs. ) CR-MD-2011-5903 
) 
MARK C. HUNTER, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE KEVIN SWAIN, Magistrate Judge 
HONORABLE KATHRYN A. STRICKLEN, District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
P~UL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 





Ada County Public Defender's Office 
200 W Front Street, Ste 1107 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1 
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5 
Hunter Has Failed To Show Error In The District 
Court's Appellate Decision Reversing The Magistrate's 
Order Suppressing Evidence ................................................................ 5 
A. Introduction ................................................................................ 5 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................... 5 
C. Correct Application Of The Law To The Facts 
Shows Officer Gibson Had Probable Cause To 
Arrest Hunter For DUI. ................................................................ 6 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................... 9 
APPENDICES (A & B) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005) ........................................ 5 
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) ................................................................. 6 
State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 194 P.3d 550 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................. 6 
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,184 P.3d 215 Ct. App. 2008) .................................. 5 
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007) ................................................... 6 
State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137,206 P.3d 501 (Ct. App. 2009) .............................. 6 
State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 922 P.2d 1059 (1996) ............................................... 6 
State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319,824 P.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1991) ............................... 6 
Virginia v. Moore, _ U.S. _, 128 S.Ct. 1598 (2008) ............................................ 6 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Mark C. Hunter appeals from the district court's appellate decision reversing 
the magistrate's order that granted Hunter's motion to suppress evidence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
As found by the magistrate, the parties below stipulated to the following facts: 
On April 16th 2011 at three minutes after midnight [Hunter] was 
stopped at Eighth and Myrtle for driving without headlights. There was 
the odor of alcohol and the defendant admitted drinking three vodka 
tonics between 7:30 and 10:30. Officer Robert Gibson responded and 
conducted three field sobriety tests. [Hunter] failed the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test, but passed the one leg stand and the walk and turn 
tests. [Hunter] was then arrested and submitted to a breath test which 
resulted in readings of .090 and .088. 
(R., p.60.) The parties below also stipulated to the following additional facts, which 
are set forth in Officer Gibson's police report: 
On 4/16/11 at 0003 hours, Officer Lacow stopped a vehicle for driving 
without headlights at Myrtle and 8th . Officer Lacow requested a STEP 
assist and [Officer Gibson] responded for the STEP assist. 
Officer Lacow identified the driver as Mark Hunter by his Idaho driver's 
license. Officer Lacow stated that he observed the vehicle come from 
the parking garage at gth and Front without headlights. Officer Lacow 
stated that the vehicle continued southbound on gth and turned 
eastbound on Myrtle still without lights. Officer Lacow stated he 
stopped the vehicle at Myrtle and 8th . The passenger was identified as 
Carrie Pereira. 
Officer Lacow stated that he could smell the odor of an alcoholic 
beverage coming from the vehicle and [Hunter] admitted to drinking. 
Officer Lacow stated he checked [Hunter's] eyes for nystagmus while 
[Hunter] [was] seated in the driver's seat. Officer Lacow stated he did 
observe nystagmus in [Hunter's] eyes. 
[Officer Gibson] had [Hunter] step out of the vehicle to conduct 
standardized field sobriety tests on the sidewalk. [Hunter] stated he 
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was coming from Fatty's and was on his way home. [Hunter] stated 
that he was at Owest Arena for the MMA fights earlier that night. 
[Hunter] stated he consumed [three] Vodka tonics that night.[1] [Hunter] 
stated that he had the beverages between 1930 and 2230 hours, 
While speaking to [Hunter], [Officer Gibson] could smell the odor of an 
alcoholic beverage coming from his person. [The officer] noticed that 
[Hunter's] eyes were glassy and bloodshot. [Hunter] stated that he 
was not taking any medications and did not have any physical 
impairments. [Hunter] stated he did not have any recent head injuries 
or eye problems. 
[Officer Gibson] conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Both 
of [Hunter's] eyes did not pursue smoothly, had distinct and sustained 
nystagmus at maximum deviation and nystagmus onset before 45 
degrees. [2] 
[Officer Gibson] asked [Hunter] if he was comfortable with the shoes 
he was wearing. [Hunter] stated that he was. [Officer Gibson] 
instructed and demonstrated the walk and turn test. [Hunter] did not 
score any errors on the test. 
[Officer Gibson] instructed and demonstrated the one leg stand test. 
[Hunter] swayed during the test. 
[Officer Gibson] checked [Hunter's] eyes a second time and he had the 
same scoring errors as the first time. 
[Officer Gibson] advised [Hunter] that [the officer] was requiring 
[Hunter] to give [the officer] a breath sample. [The officer] placed 
[Hunter] in handcuffs. [The officer] placed [Hunter] in the back of [the 
officer's] patrol vehicle. While [Hunter] was in the back of [the] vehicle, 
[the officer] checked his mouth for any foreign substances and did not 
find any. [The officer] advised [Hunter] not to burp, belch, or vomit for 
the fifteen minute waiting period. [The officer] played the ALS audio 
recording. After the fifteen minute waiting period, [the officer] had 
[Hunter] blow into the Lifeloc instrument. [Hunter] blew .090/.088 .... 
1 The police report actually indicates Hunter stated he consumed "four Vodka 
tonics." (R., p.68.) However, the parties stipulated below that Hunter "admitted 
consuming a total of three Vodka tonics and/or cocktails instead of four." (R., p.63.) 
2 At the suppression hearing, Officer Gibson testified he gave Hunter a score of six 
out of six points on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. (SH Tr., p.17, Ls.12-25; see 
also R., p.71.) 
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(R., p.68; see also R., p.63-65 (written stipulation); Tr., p.8, L.17 - p.12, L.10 (oral 
stipulation).) 
The state charged Hunter with driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), a 
second offense. (R., p.6.) Hunter moved to suppress the breath test results, 
contending they were "obtained as the result of an investigatory detention that 
exceeded the scope allowed by Idaho law." (R., p.43; see also R., p.34 (,,[T]he 
warrantless detention exceeded the scope allowed during a traffic stop ... ").) 
Following a hearing, the magistrate reframed the issue as follows: 
It is clear the breath test was obtained after the defendant's arrest. 
The investigative detention had ended at that point. If the arrest was 
supported by probable cause the breath test is admissible. If the arrest 
was not supported by probable cause the breath test is a product of an 
illegal arrest and must be suppressed. 
(R., p.61.) Ultimately, the magistrate found probable cause lacking and granted 
Hunter's motion to suppress. (R., pp.60-62.) The state timely appealed to the 
district court, which reversed. (R., pp.3-4, 77-81, 83, 140-50.) Hunter timely 
appealed. (R., pp.151-53.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Hunter states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the District Judge err in reversing the order of the 
magistrate? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Hunter failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision 




Hunter Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Appellate Decision 
Reversing The Magistrate's Order Suppressing Evidence 
A. Introduction 
The district court reversed the magistrate's order granting Hunter's motion to 
suppress, ruling that, before he administered the breath test to Hunter, "Officer 
Gibson possessed information that would lead a person of ordinary care and 
prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that Hunter had 
been driving under the influence. In other words, Officer Gibson had probable cause 
to arrest Hunter for [DUll." (R., pp.147-48.) Hunter challenges the district court's 
decision, arguing as he did below that, once Hunter passed the walk and turn and 
one-leg stand field sobriety tests, the officer no longer had any basis to suspect, 
much less probable cause to believe, that Hunter was driving under the influence of 
alcohol. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-11.) Hunter's arguments fail. Correct application of 
the law to the facts of this case supports the district court's conclusion that the 
totality of the information known to the officer gave him probable cause to arrest 
Hunter for DUI. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 Ct. App. 2008) 
(citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)). When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's 
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findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 
302,160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
C. Correct Application Of The Law To The Facts Shows Officer Gibson Had 
Probable Cause To Arrest Hunter For DUI 
"Warrantless arrests made upon probable cause do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment." State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346,349, 194 P.3d 550, 553 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Virginia v. Moore, _ U.S. _, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1607 (2008)). 
"Probable cause for an arrest is not measured by the same level of proof required for 
conviction." Chapman, 146 Idaho at 351, 194 P.3d at 555 (citation omitted). Rather, 
probable cause only "requires that the police possess information that would lead a 
person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong 
suspicion that a crime has been committed by the arrestee." State v. Finnicum, 147 
Idaho 137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). The probable 
cause determination "depends upon the totality of the circumstances and the 
assessment of probabilities in the particular factual context." Finnicum, 147 Idaho at 
140,206 P.3d at 504 (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003)). The 
facts upon which the probable cause finding is based are evaluated objectively and 
must take into account the officers' expertise and experience. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 
at 140, 206 P.3d at 504 (citing State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d 
1059, 1062-63 (1996)); Chapman, 146 Idaho at 351, 194 P.3d at 555 (citing State v. 
Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319,323,824 P.2d 894,898 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
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Application of the foregoing standards to the undisputed facts of this case 
shows Hunter has failed to meet his burden of showing the district court erred in 
reversing the magistrate's order granting his motion to suppress. As correctly 
summarized by the state below, the evidence presented in relation to Hunter's 
suppression motion established the following facts that, viewed in their totality, 
support the district court's conclusion that Officer Gibson had probable cause to 
arrest Hunter for DUI: 
Hunter had driven several blocks without headlights in the dark at 0003 
hours. [R, p.68.] Officer Gibson knew that the officer who initially 
stopped Hunter could smell the odor of alcohol coming from the open 
driver's side window of the vehicle and that Hunter admitted to drinking 
earlier that evening. [Id.] He also knew that the officer that initially 
stopped Hunter had observed nystagmus in Hunter's eyes while 
Hunter was still seated in his vehicle. [Id.] Officer Gibson corroborated 
the initial officer's observations by also noting the odor of alcoholic 
beverage coming from the vehicle and noting that Hunter's eyes were 
glassy and bloodshot. [Id.] After Hunter exited his vehicle, Officer 
Gibson could smell the odor of alcohol coming from Hunter's person. 
[Id.] He learned that Hunter was coming from Fatty's Bar, had 
previously been at the Mixed Martial Arts fights that evening, and was 
on his way home. [Id.] Hunter told the officer that he had consumed 
three vodka tonics that night between the 1930 and 2230 hours (7:30 
p.m. - 10:30 p.m.). [Id.] Hunter also stated that he was not taking any 
medications, did not have any physical impairments, and did not have 
any recent head injuries or eye problems. [Id.] Hunter failed the HGN 
test, showing 6 out of6 signs of impairment. [Id.; S.H. Tr., p.17, Ls.12-
25.] Hunter swayed during the one-leg stand test. [R, p.68; SH Tr., 
p.18, Ls.5-7.] Hunter did not score any errors on the walk and turn 
test. [R, p.68; SH Tr., p.18, Ls.1-4.] Officer Gibson then re-
administered the HGN test, which Hunter again failed. [R, p.68.] 
When all of these facts are considered collectively, the officer 
possessed probable cause to arrest Hunter for driving while under the 
influence of alcohol. 
(R, pp.113-14; see also R., pp.146-47 (district court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order reciting many of the same facts as collectively supplying the officer with 
probable cause to arrest Hunter for DUI).) 
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Hunter challenges the district court's finding of probable cause, arguing as he 
did below that "Idaho law requires that if an individual passes the SFSTs, absent 
something 'unique,' the reasonable suspicion for his continued investigatory 
detention is dispelled." (Appellant's brief, pp.8-11.) As correctly noted by the state 
below, none of the cases Hunter cites support this proposition. (See R., pp.131-
135.) Rather than repeat the well-researched and well-reasoned arguments set 
forth in the state's briefing before the district court, the state hereby adopts the 
arguments advanced by the state below and incorporates them by reference herein. 
For this Court's convenience, a copy of the state's Reply Brief on appeal to the 
district court is attached to this brief as Appendix A. The state also adopts and 
incorporates by reference herein the district court's analysis as set forth at pages 5 
through 9 of its Memorandum Decision and Order. (See R., pp.144-48.) For this 
Court's convenience, a copy of the district court's appellate decision is attached to 
this brief as Appendix B. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
appellate decision reversing the magistrate's order suppressing evidence and 
remanding this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of November, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney Gene al 
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COMES NOW, the Appellant by and through' Elizabeth A. Koeckeritz, Assistant City 
Attorney, and hereby files its Reply Brief in the above-captioned matter. 
. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court Erred In Granting Hunter's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
The trial court erred when it granted HU11ter's motion to suppress, concluding that 
Hunter's arrest was not supported by probable cause. The court erred because the evidence 
presented was more than sufficient to supply probable cause to arrest for DUL Hunter asserts 
that the trial court was correct in its ruling, arguing that "if a suspect passes the field sobriety 
tests, the officer's reasonable suspicion of a law violation is dispelled." (Respondent's brief, p. 
3.) He further misconstrues the state's argument and writes, "the state's assertion that the fact 
which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion can also give rise to probable cause to arrest even if the 
suspect passes the field sobriety tests is incorrect and contrary to two decades of case law." 
(Respondent's brief, p. 4.) The state contends that Hunter's arguments must fail, however, 
because they are without merit and contrary to the law. 
B. The Trial Court Erred When It Granted Hunter's Motion To Suppress 
Hunter asserts, "1) If a person is suspected of operating a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol, the field sobriety tests are the least intrusive means to confirm or dispel the 
officer's suspicion; and 2) If a suspect passes the field sobriety tests, the officer's reasonable 
./ 
suspicion of a law violation is ,dispelled." (Respondent's brief, p. 3.) This is simply not the law. 
1 
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In support of the proposition that field sobriety tests are the least intrusive means to 
confirm or dispel the offi.cer's suspicion whether an individual is driving under the influence, 
Hunter cites four cases. However, nothing in the four cases that Hunter cites stands for the 
proposition that an individual must perform field sobriety tests, or that satisfactory performance 
on those tests negates the other facts which an officer has ih his possession. For example, Hunter 
cites State v. Jones, 115 Idaho 1029,772 P.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1989), for the proposition that "the 
request to perform field sobriety tests is a reasonable attempt by the officer to obtain information 
confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicion that the driver was driving while under the 
influence." (Respondent's brief, p. 2.) The actual sentence from the case reads, "This 
questioning, including the officer request that Jones perform field sobriety tests, were reasonable 
attempts by the officer to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions." 
Jones, 115 Idaho at 1033, 772 P.2d at 240 (internal citation omitted). Thus, contrary to Hunter's 
assertion, the court does not look only at field sobriety tests in making its determination but also 
looks at questioning and other factors. 
Likewise, Hunter cites State v. Ferreira, 113 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999) 
and State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 175 P .3d 216 (Ct. App. 2008), for the proposition that field 
sobriety tests are the least intrusive means reasonably available in a short timeframe to 
reasonable confirm or dispel the officer's suspicion. (Respondent's brief, p. 3.) While the state 
does not dispute this statement, it is. important to note that in neither case did the court hold that 
field sobriety tests were the only way to confirm or dispel an officer's suspicion of DUI or that 
an officer could not use his common sense judgment and look to other factors' in deciding that 




ignore other indicia of being under the influence simply because an individual performs 
satisfactorily on one field sobriety test. 
Probable cause to arrest for DUI may exist even if an individual does not perform field 
sobriety tests and probable cause to arrest may exist on lesser facts than those in present in the 
instant case. See State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct.App.2009) 
(officers had probable cause to arrest where defendant smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her 
speech, had'bloodshot eyes, seemed confused, and a witness opined she was highly intoxic:ated); 
State v. Martinez-Gonzal~z, 152 Idaho 775, --, 275 P.3d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2012) (officers had 
probable cause to arrest where 1) officers observed open beer cans in defendant's vehicle, 2) 
'defendant had slightly glazed eyes and slurred speech, 3) an odor of alcohol was present, 4) 
defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, 4)' defendant drove his vehicle immediately after 
officers told him not to drive). Here, evidence existed beyond that which a court found sufficient 
to support probable cause in Finnicum or Martinez-Gonzalez: Hunter had driven several blocks 
without headlights in the dark at 0003 hours. Officer Gibson knew that the officer who initially 
stopped Hunter could smell the odor of alcohol coming from the open driver's side window of 
the vehicle and that Hunter admitted to drinking earlier that evening. He also knew that the 
officer that initially stopped Hunter had observed nystagmus in Hunter's eyes while Hunter was 
still seated in his vehicle. Officer Gibson corroborated the initial officer's observations by also 
noting the odor of alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and noting that Hunter's eyes 
were glassy and bloodshot. After Hunter exited his vehicle, Officer Gibson could smell the odor 
of alcohol coming from Hunter's person. He learned that Hunter was coming from Fatty's Bar, 




Hunter told the officer that he had consumed three vodka tomcs that night between the 1930 and 
2230 hours (7:30 p.m. - 10:30 p.m.). Hunter also stated that he was not taking any medications, 
did not have any physical impairments, and did not have any recent head injuries or eye 
problems. Hunter failed the HGN test, showing 6 out of 6 signs of impairment. Hunter swayed 
during the one-leg stand test. Hunter did not score any errors on the walk and turn test. Officer 
Gibson then re-administered the HGN test, which Hunter again failed. These observations 
provided more probable cause than found in either Finnicum or Martinez-Gonzalez. 
Further, nothing requires an officer to disregard his observations simply because an 
individual perfonns satisfactorily on some field sobriety tests. The trial court misconstrued the 
holding of State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (Idaho 1991). In Garrett, the defendant 
was administered seven field sobriety tests, including the HGN, on suspicion of DUI. The 
defendant refused a BAC test. At trial, the state presented testimony that despite there not being 
a blow, the defendant's HGN test result was proof that he was over the legal limit. The Supreme 
Court found that the admission of that testimony was error, but in light of the other FST results, 
it was not reversible error. Garrett, 119 Idaho at 882, 811 at 492. The Court further held that an 
HGN test result alone could not be correlated to a particular BAC level, and that although an 
" ... HGN test result does supply probable cause for arrest, standing alone that result does not 
provide prc;ofpositive of DUI, because many other factors may cause nystagmus." Garrett, 119 
Idaho at 881, 811 at 491. To hold, as the court did in Hunter, that Garrett stands for the 
proposition that "[t]he HGN test is a reliable indicator of impairment only if corroborated by 
other field sobriety tests" misconstrues the holding of that case. Rather, Garrett simply stands 




BAC level or used alone to show that the a defendant was "under the influence." Here, the state 
is neither seeking to use the HGN test result at trial to have the officer·correlate it to a certain 
BAC level, nor to use the HGN test as proof positive that Hunter was "under the influence." 
Rather, the state is simply seeking to use the HGN test result as part of its probable cause 
determination - a purpose which in no way is prohibited by the holding of Garrett. 
The officer used the HGN test in conjunction with other tests and observations in 
developing probable cause to arrest Hunter for DUI. The HGN test was consistent with the 
officer's observation of the Hunter's bloodshot and glassy eyes, odor of alcohol, admissions, 
traffic violation, and performance on the one-leg stand. Nothing in the law requires the officer to 
disregard these factors simply because Hunter performed satisfactorily on the walk-and-tum test 
and showed only one indicia of impairment on the one-leg stand. Probable cause requires an 
examination of "all facts considered as a whole." State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 678, 603 P.2d 
1009, 1010 (1979). Because "all of the facts considered as a whole" give rise to probable cause 
to arrest Hunter, this Court should reverse the trial court and hold that Hunter's arrest was 
supported by probable cause. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above arguments, the Appellant requests this Court to reverse the trial 




DATED thist ~ day of August 2012. 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
<., 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I'have on this CZ ~ of August 2012, served the foregoing 
document on all parties of record as follows: 
Erik J. ODaniel 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise,ID 83702 
s- U.S. Mail 




Elizleth Sc KoeckeritV ' 




.' , . 
FILED 
NO' ___ ~::;;-;::;:;:---9---
A.M ____ -tP.M __ ' +--_ 
MAR '29 20t3 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY LYCAN 
OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH J1JDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) Plaintiffl Appellant, 
vs. 
MARK C. HUNTER, 
DefendantlRespondent. 








This is an appeal by the State of the magistrate's decision, Han. Kevin Swain, granting 
the defendant's Mark Hunter's (Hunter's) motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth 
hereinafter, the magistrate's decision will be reversed and this case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The magistrate found the following facts in his December 6,2011 decision: 
This is a motion to suppress the results of the defendant's breath test. The 
parties have stipulated to the pertinent facts which are as follows: On April 
16th 2011 at three minutes after midnight the defendant was stopped at Eighth 
and Myrtle for driving without headlights. There was the odor of alcohol and 
the defendant admitted drinking three vodka tonics between 7:30 and 10:30. 
Officer Robert Gibson responded and conducted three field sobriety tests. 
The defendant failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, but passed the one 
leg stand and the walk turn tests. The defendant was then arrested and 
submitted to a breath test which resulted in readings of .090 and .088. 
Decision and Order, at 1. 
In addition, the following also appears to be undisputed: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -- PAGE 1 
000140 
Mark Hunter was arrested Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, second 
offense, in violation ofIdaho Code §§ 18-8004(1)(a) and 18-8005(4) on April 
16, 2011. He thereafter filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the 
'warrantless detention exceed( ed) the scope allowed during a traffic stop 
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 17 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho.' The State 
objected 'to the motion and the matter was set for a hearing. Prior to the 
hearing, the parties entered the police report in the matter into evidence and 
stipulated that the court could consider its contents in reaching its decision 
regarding the motion to suppress. The report reads, in relevant part: 
On 4/16111 at 0003 hours, Officer Lacow stopped a vehicle for 
driving without headlights at Myrtle and gLn. Officer Lacow 
requested a STEP assist and I responded for the STEP assist ... 
Officer Lacow identified the driver as Mark Hunter by his Idaho 
driver's license. Officer Lacow stated that he observed the vehicle 
come from the parking garage at 9th and Front without headlights. 
Officer Lacow stated that the vehicle continued southbound on 9th 
and turned eastbound on Myrtle still without lights. 
Officer Lacow stated that he stopped the vehicle at Myrtle and 8th . 
The passenger was identified as Carrie Pereira. 
Officer Lacow stated that he could smell the odor of alcoholic 
beverage coming from the vehicle and Mark admitting to drinking. 
Officer Lacow stated he checked Mark's eyes for nystagmus I while 
Mark (was) seated in the driver's seat. Officer Lacow stated he did 
observe nystagmus in Mark's eyes. 
I had Mark step out of the vehicle to conduct standardized field 
sobriety tests on the sidewalk. Mark stated he was coming from 
Fatty's and was on his way home. Mark stated that he was at Quest 
Arena for the MMA fights earlier that night. Mark stated he 
consumed (three) Vodka tonics that night.2 Mark stated that he had 
the beverages between 1930 and 2230 hours. While speaking to 
Mark, I could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from 
his person. I noticed that Mark's eyes. were glassy and bloodshot. 
Mark stated that he was not taking any medications and did not have 
\ 
j"Gaze nystagmus [is] an involuntary movement of the eyeballs when the individual looks to the side, which is 
evidence of intoxication." State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 731, 979 P.2d 128, 133 (Ct. App. 1999). 
2"The police report reads that Mark consumed four Vodka tonics that night. However, the state and defense 
stipulated that Mark told Officer Gibson be consumed three Vodka tonics that night." Appellant's Brief, at 2 n.l, 
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any physical impairments. Mark stated he did not have any recent 
head injuries or eye problems. 
I conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Both of Mark's eyes 
did not pursue smoothly, had distinct and sustained nystagmus at 
maximum deviation and nystagmus onset before 45 degrees. 
I asked Mark if he was comfortable with the shoes he was wearing. 
Mark stated that he was. I instructed and demonstrated the walk and 
turn test. Mark did not score any errors on the test. 
I instructed and demonstrated the one leg stand test. Mark swayed 
during the test. 
I checked Mark's eyes a second time and he had the same scoring 
errors as the first time. 
I advised Mark that I was requiring him to give me a breath sample. 
r placed Mark in handcuffs. I placed Mark in the back of my vehicle. 
While Mark was in the back of my vehicle, I checked his mouth for 
any foreign substances and did not find any. I advised Mark not to 
burp, belch, or vomit for the fifteen minute waiting period, I had 
Mark blow into the Lifeloc instrument. Mark blew .0901088. Mark 
was advised of the results ... 
I transported Mark to the Ada County Jail. Mark was charged with 
DDI-2nd. 
The court held a brief hearing on the matter at which Officer Gibson, the 
arresting officer, testified. The court issued a written decision in which it held 
that the defendant's arrest was not supported by probable cause and granted 
the defendant's motion to suppress. The State filed a timely interlocutory 
appeal. Appellant's Brief, at 1-3. (internal citations omitted). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Generally 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving a trial 
de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 
121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of law or statute is a 
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question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 462, 4 
P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.1 prqvides that the following judgments and orders are 
appealable from a magistrate to a district court: "(a) A final judgment of conviction; (b) By a 
defendant only, from an order granting or denying a withheld judgment on a verdict or plea of 
-
guilty; ( c) An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint; (d) An order granting a motion to 
suppress evidence in a misdemeanor criminal action; (e) An order denying a motion for new 
trial; (f) An order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant or the 
state; (g) Any order, judgment or decree in a special criminal proceeding in which an appeal is 
provided by statute; (h) Any order holding a person in contempt of court other than those 
contempts defined in Rule 42(a); (i) An interlocutory order when processed in the manner 
provided by Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and accepted by the district court," (Emphasis 
added). 
"When an exercise of discretion is involved, this Court conducts a three step analysis (1) 
whether the trial court perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
specific choices; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by the exercise of reason." 
Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 902, 950 P.2d 1237, 1241 (1997). 
B. Suppression 
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State 
v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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"\Vhen reviewing 'seizure' issues, we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous.3 We freely review, de novo, the trial court's legal determination of 
whether or not an illegal seizure occurred." State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 466, 988 P.2d 689, 
692 (1999). 
ANALYSIS 
In this appeal, the State asserts that "the trial court erred in concluding that Hunter's 
arrest was not supported by probable cause." Appellant's Brief, at 3. "The trial court erred 
because, as a matter of law, the evidence available to the officer at the time of the arrest 
supplied probable cause for Hunter's arrest." Id. 
In his decision, the magistrate framed the issue before him: "It is clear the breath test 
was obtained after the defendant's arrest. The investigative detention had ended at that point. If 
the arrest was supported by probable cause the breath test is admissible. If the arrest was not 
supported by probable cause the breath test is a product of an illegal arrest and must be 
suppressed." Decision and Order, at 2. 
"It is clear Officer Gibson relied heavily on the defendant's failure of the HGN test in 
making his decision to arrest. 4 Officer Gibson testified he places more importance on that test 
because the subject cannot practice for the test. This does not comport with the applicable law 
concerning the reliability of the HGN test. The HGN test is a reliable indicator of impairment 
only if corroborated by other field sobriety tests." Id. 
3See also State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234, 127 P.3d 133, 137 (2005) ("The Court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence."). . 
4Actually, Officer Gibson, who testified that he had conducted "several hundred" DUI investigations, testified that 
"I just have to take into account everything that I am seeing, but the eyes are ... J factor that into a little bit more .. 
. it's just a ... body function they have no control over." November 7, 2011 Hearing Transcript, at 14, 18. 
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The magistrate cited State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881 (1991) for the proposition that 
"in conjunction with other field sobriety tests, a positive HGN test result does supply probable 
cause" for an arrest, standing alone that result does not provide positive proof of DUr, because 
many other factors may cause nystagmus." Id., at 2-3. 
The magistrate found that "the other field sobriety tests not only failed to corroborate the 
HGN test, they completely contradicted it. The defendant demonstrated virtually no impairment 
when performing the one leg stand and no impairment at all when performing the walk and tum 
test. The results of those tests rendered the HGN test unreliable as a matter of law. The 
remaining factors considered by the officer, even taken together, fail to rise to the level of 
probable cause to support an arrest." Id., at 3. 
The State argues that "[t]he evidence presented to the court in the form of the police 
reports and the arresting officer's testimony provided probable cause to arrest Hunter for driving 
under the influence as a matter oflaw." Appellant's Brief, at 6. 
"Probable cause for an arrest exists where an officer possesses information that would 
lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong 
presumption that a person they have placed under arrest is guilty of a crime. Probable cause is 
not measured by the same level of proof required for conviction. Rather, probable cause deals 
with the factual and practical considerations on which reasonable and prudent persons act. The 
court must judge the facts against an objective standard when evaluating an officer's actions. 
That is, whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search, would 
warrant a reasonable person in holding the belief that the action taken was appropriate." State v. 
Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 779, 275 P.3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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The question before this Court is whether Officer Gibson possessed probable cause to 
believe that Hunter had been driving under the influence at the time he was arrested, which was 
before he was administered the breath tests. In other words, whether Officer Gibson, at the time 
of his arrest of Hunter "possess[ ed] information that would lead a person of ordinary care and 
prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that" Hunter was guilty of a 
crime. 
"Idaho Code § 18-8004(1) makes it a crime 'for any person who is under the influence 
of alcohol ... to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state ... 
upon public or private property open to the public.'" Martinez-Gonzalez, 275 P.3d at 5. 
"This Court has had numerous occasions to determine whether the findings of fact in a 
particular case constitute probable cause to arrest under suspicion of driving under the influence. 
In some instances, we have found probable cause where the defendant had driven erratically, 
emitted a strong odor of alcohol, slurred his speech, and admitted to consuming alcohol . . . 
Under other circumstances, we have found reasonable suspicion on similar facts." Martinez-
Gonzalez, 275 P.3d at 5-6. 
There was little testimony given during the suppression hearing, since the parties had 
already stipulated to the factual content contained in Officer Gibson's police report. See 
November 7, 2011 Suppression Hearing Transcript, at 8 ("[T]he parties are willing to stipulate 
to admission of the police report as an exhibit ... in lieu of putting an officer on the stand and 
having him re-hash what his reports says."). See also Stipulated Admission of Police Reports. 
According to the police report, at the time of Hunter's arrest, Officer Gibson was in 
possession of the following facts with which to find probable cause that Hunter had been driving 
under the influence: (l) he observed him for a distance driving at night with his headlights off; . 
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(2) "he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and Mark 
admitted to drinking;" (3) "he did observe nystagmus in Mark's eyes;" (4) "Mark stated that he 
consumed [three] Vodka tonics;" (5) "[w]hile speaking to Mark, I could smell the odor of an 
alcoholic beverage coming from his person. I noticed that Mark's eyes were glassy and 
bloodshot. Mark stated that he was not taking any medications and did not have any physical 
impairments. Mark stated he did not have any recent head injuries or eye problems. I conducted 
the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Both of Mark's eyes did not pursue smoothly, had distinct 
and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation and nystagmus onset before 45 degrees;" (6) "r 
instructed and demonstrated the one leg stand test. Mark swayed during the test;" and (7) "I 
checked Mark's eyes a second time and he had the same scoring errors as the fIrst time." Boise 
Police Report - Driving Under the Influence (DR 2011-108828). 
At the time Officer Gibson placed Hunter under arrest, he knew that Hunter had been 
driving for a while without his headlights on at night, his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, there 
was an odor of alcohol coming from him and his vehicle, he admitted to having consumed three 
vodka tonics, he twice failed the nystagmus test (in the absence of taking any medications or 
possessing any physical impairments, recent head injuries, or eye problems), and he swayed 
during the one leg stand test. 
In the Court's view, pursuant to the guidance set forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Martinez-Gonzalez, 5 Officer Gibson possessed information that would lead a person of ordinary 
SSee Martinez-Gonzalez, 275 P.3d at 5-6 ("[W}e have found probable cause where the defendant had driven 
erratically, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, slurred his speech, and admitted to consuming alcohol ... officers had 
probable cause where defendant smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her speech, had bloodshot eyes, seemed 
confused, and a witness opined she was highly intoxicated ... probable cause established where driver weaved in 
and out of his lane, smelled of alcohol, slurred his speech, had bloodshot eyes, and admitted to drinking ... 
[probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion:] defendant was speeding before being pulled over, emitted a strong 
odor of alcohol, and admitted to consuming alcohol ... officers observed open beer cans in the vehicle where 
Martinez-Gonzalez sat in the driver' seat ... [he] had slightly glazed eyes and slurred speech ... an odor of alcohol 
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care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that Hunter had been 
driving under the influence. In other words, Officer Gibson had probable cause to arrest Hunter 
for driving under the influence. 
The magistrate correctly noted that State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881, 811 P .2d 488, 
491 (1991) states "in conjunction with other field sobriety tests, a positive HGN test result does 
supply probable cause for arrest, standing alone that result does not provide proof positive of 
DUI, because many other factors may cause nystagrnus.,,6 However, that was not all the 
evidence Officer Gibson relied upon. The Court does not agree with the magistrate's legal 
conclusion, which is freely reviewed here, that "[t]he remaining factors considered by the 
officer, even taken together, fail to rise to the level of probable cause to support an arrest." 
Decision and Order, at 3. The magistrate focused too narrowly on the language of Garrett. 
Hunter argues "if a suspect passes the field sobriety tests, the officer's reasonable 
suspicion of a law violation is dispelled." Respondent's Brief, at 3. However, even assuming 
that this assertion oflaw is correct/ it is not factually accurate here. Hunter (twice) failed the 
nystagmus test and he also "swayed" during the one leg stand test. 8 
[was] present ... [he] admitted to consuming alcohol ... and [he] drove his vehicle across the parking lot 
immediately after the officers advised him not to."). 
6"[F]actors other than alcohol in the bloodstream can cause nystagmus. Nystagmus may be congenital, or due to a 
variety of factors that affect the brain." 119 Idaho at 881, 811 P .2d at 491. 
7 See, e.g., State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183, 125 P 3d 536, 539 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[T]he suspicion of DUI ... 
was removed when Wigginton performed satisfactorily on the sobriety testes] .... "). 
80fficer Gibson conducted three field sobriety tests on Hunter: horizontal gaze nystagmus CHON), walk and turn, 
and one leg stand. He assessed Hunter six points for the HGN (decision points four or more), zero points for the 
walk and tum (decision points two or more), and one point for the ,one leg stand (decision points two or more). See 
DUI Supplement (DR# J 08-828). A "decision point" has been defined as indicating "a possibility of intoxication." 
See Hoganv. State, 2010 WL2367497, *5 (Tex. Ct. App.). 
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the district court hereby reverses the magistrate's 
decision granting Hunter's suppression·motion.9 This case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this memorandum decision and order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ?:-<{-\/0 day of March 2013. 
~t~tka. )h'c~ 
Kathryn A. 31iCiden 
Senior District Judge 
9"As the defendant's arrest was not supported by probable cause, and the breath test is a product of that arrest, the 
defendant's motion to suppress the breath test is hereby, GRANTED." Decision and Order, at 3. 
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